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I.

INTRODUCTION

Eight months after losing the 2008 election, ex-Vice Presidential Candidate Sarah Palin
quit her job as Alaskan governor. While this might signify her total removal from politics, the
months following her withdrawal Palin defied this notion thrusting herself onto the national
scene, publishing her memoir Going Rogue and beginning a nation-wide (self) promotional tour.
Given her heightened visibility, the media has (not surprisingly) scrutinized Palin’s every move
concluding that she is a populist. The New Yorker ranks Palin’s “insistent ordinariness” among
other famed American populists such as William Jennings Bryan who “have always been
divisive and polarizing. 1 Their [populists] job is not to win national elections but to carry the
torch and inspire the faithful.”2 On the other hand, Newsweek characterizes her among a trend of
“faux populists [that] feast on emotions—anxiety, anger, resentment—that intensify in hard
times. . . more accurately described as plain old reactionaries.”3 The Daily Beast calls Palin’s
appeal to the ‘common American people’ less than genuine as she tours the country in her
private jet.4 The media cannot quite figure out Palin or populism; is she really a populist? And if
so, what does that mean for American politics?
Populism has characterized various political figures throughout time and throughout the
world. In the late 1800’s The People’s Party – an American populist party – emerged because of
agrarian unrest. Also in the 19th Century, Russia saw populism manifest as a reaction to
1

Sam Tanenhaus, “North Star: Populism, Politics and the power of Sarah Palin,” The New
Yorker, December 7, 2009.
2
Ibid.
3
Jonathan Alter. “Enter the Foxulists: The Faux Populism of Palin, Dobbs, and Beck,”
Newsweek, December 7, 2009.
4
"Palin's Bus Hoax," The Daily Beast, entry posted November 29, 2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-11-29/palins-bus-hoax/ (accessed April 6,
2010).
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Alexander IIs emancipation of the serfs.5 Latin America has experienced waves of populism
beginning with Argentina’s Juan Perón, who created a lasting populist movement appealing to
Argentina’s working class. Recently, Latin America has experienced another populist surge via
leaders such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Argentina’s Kirchner
administration. The term ‘populist’ has even infiltrated contemporary American politics with the
emergence of Sarah Palin. Though all of these leaders and movements, along with others, fall
under the populist umbrella, academic literature has trouble reaching a consensus on populism’s
definition.
To understand populism and its leaders, the term “populist” deserves clearer elucidation.
When approaching literature on populism, most theories begin describing the difficulty that
theorists have had defining the concept. Francisco Panizza opens his book with this disclaimer:
“it has become almost a cliché to start writing on populism by lamenting the lack of clarity about
the concept and casting doubts about its usefulness for political analysis.” 6 Given that the term
populism has been ascribed to many leaders and movements, I do not doubt the utility in
understanding the concept. Many theories present a laundry list of criteria, while others narrow
the scope to geographic locations or time periods.7 I agree that these theories do little to
theoretically clarify populism, but that does not mean other theories have not identified a
theoretical understanding of populism useful for understanding the phenomenon. I hope to
present both an accurate overview of various academic attempts to define populism along with
my own conceptions of the phenomenon.
5

J.F Conway “Populism in the United States, Russia, and Canada: Explaining the Roots of
Canada's Third Parties,” Canadian Journal of Political Science (1978), 113.
6
Francisco Panizza, introduction to Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, by Francisco
Panizza (London: Verso, 2005),1.
7
In Francisco Panizza’s Introduction he outlines various definitions that limit populism to
geography or time, 2-17.
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Instead of limiting populism to a specific ideology or time period, my approach analyzes
populism as a movement that emerges under certain political conditions. Though certain populist
movements share similar economic or political ideologies, what connects all populist
governments is not these ideologies, but rather the way in which populism emerges. When a
current government fails to address the needs of a large enough constituency it creates conditions
ripe for populism. In other words, it is a movement, a reaction to a deficient political system.
‘The people’ feel neglected in some way by their government; the populist leader appeals to this,
suggesting s/he can better represent their political desires. Using certain tactics, which I will later
outline, these leaders present themselves as separate from the current establishment to win ‘the
people’ over.
After more clearly defining the parameters of populism, I look at its manifestations
through contemporary movements. Specifically I look to Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Venezuela’s
Hugo Chávez and former Alaskan governor Sarah Palin to demonstrate how they exemplify
populism. Using these leaders I show how they embody all features of populist governance.
These leaders operate in different contexts yet they all make similar political moves as they
attempt to gain power. Both Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez fit into this framework and have
both used populist tactics for political success. On the other hand, Palin exemplifies certain
aspects of the populist leader, but has not yet demonstrated that she has wooed the American
people. Yet, Palin still provides a useful example of the ways populist leaders conceptualize and
relate to their people and perhaps in the future Palin will attain the political success of her peers;
however, also I go on to argue that Palin – operating in a different political context than her
contemporaries – will not have the same successes as other contemporary populists.
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Given both populism and democracy’s focus on representation and ‘the people’, some
theorists argue for populism’s place as a democratic mode of governance. After discussing the
features of populism, I address this question of whether populism is a mode of democracy. My
analysis discusses the way populism approaches representation, arguing that populism reflects a
less democratic type of representation than liberal democracy. However, using Margaret
Canovan’s theory of populism as a shadow of democracy demonstrates how populism does fit
within liberal democracy. Canovan argues that populism is an inherent part of democracy that
manifests when democracy relies too heavily on institutions and not enough of the ideal of ‘the
people’. As I explain, I largely agree with Canovan’s reading of populism as a reaction to the
inherent elitism within liberal democracy, and therefore an inherent aspect of democracy. I also
agree with her ominous terminology ‘shadow’ that implies populism is a negative reaction to
liberal democracy’s shortcomings in that the way it ‘corrects’ presents a worse democratic mode
of governance than even elitist liberal democracy.
As discussed earlier, the idea that populist leaders represent the true will of ‘the people’
gives populism some claim to democratic legitimacy. Looking closer at the ways these leaders
believe they represent their people lends insight into the type of democracy populists perpetuate.
Populists often refer to ‘the people’, justifying their rule using the rhetoric of ‘the people’. Via
speeches, interviews and some secondary sources, I specifically look at how these leaders
reference ‘the people’, in what contexts and how they later define ‘the people’. This
understanding of the ways populist leaders define their people demonstrates how these leaders
relate to their constituencies and whom they try to represent when making political decisions and
reforms, once elected. Additionally, looking at the way populist leaders conceive of their people,
I argue that the populist ‘people’ differs from an American or liberal democratic understanding
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of this term. Though there are many democratic conceptions of ‘the people’, I choose to focus on
‘the people’ as the electorate. Comparing the electorate to the way Morales, Chávez and Palin
conceive of ‘the people’ demonstrates a key difference between populism and liberal democracy.
After making these general comparisons, I expand my findings to Sarah Palin and
populism in the United States. Sarah Palin’s populism cannot succeed in America’s liberal
democracy. The way populist leaders use the rhetoric of ‘the people’ to gain power demonstrates
the power of such rhetoric in their given government type, country and political climate. As
discussed above, populist leaders refer to a homogenized ‘people’ that have a specific legislative
need that is not being met. The United States political system does not operate under the same
terms. I suggest that the United States adheres to a liberal democratic notion of ‘the people’ that
fundamentally differs from the populist notion. Therefore, successful American leaders must also
abide by this notion. Though Sarah Palin does not fall into the “successful” leader category (yet),
her actions and rhetoric qualify her as a populist. If she tries to appeal to a homogenized
segment to gain political popularity, she will fail. Unlike Bolivia, a politically underserved
homogenized majority does not exist in America – in other words our idea of ‘the people’
appreciates including diverse people from different cultural or economic backgrounds. At least
ideally, Americans relate to each other because each has the power to vote. By contrast populists
believe their constituencies relate on cultural or economic lines. Therefore, I hypothesize that for
Palin to attain electoral/governmental success in the United States she would have to conform to
the American notion of ‘the people’ as a heterogeneous electorate.
This paper will enhance democratic theory not only showing how populist rulers define
this “democratic” term, but also how it fits in with democratic theorist’s definitions. My
comparisons will demonstrate a more concrete understanding of the populist leaders appeal to
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‘the people’, and therefore a relationship between populism and democracy. Not only does my
research have theoretical importance, but it also has relevance for today’s world. Due to the
success of recent populist movements, studying this movement/regime type adds greater
understanding to these emergent governments. Populist governments are sometimes
characterized as totalitarian dictatorships and are therefore perceived as a threat to liberal
democracy. If populism presents such danger, a deeper understanding will help combat this
threat. Or perhaps, populism does not present any sort of threat, but rather demonstrates a
different understanding of democracy compatible with liberal democracy. Either way
understanding populism is useful for contemporary politics. Even if populism presents a threat to
liberal democracy, its call for increased participation of the politically disenfranchised deserves
respect in that is points to the very real elitism that exists in liberal democracies. Whether
genuine or not, populism calls for increased access and agency for the powerless. Though
populism may not present the ideal solution to liberal democracy’s faults, it illuminates these
problems and offers an alternative approach.
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II.

DEFINING POPULISM

Before analyzing modern populist leaders, defining populism is useful for understanding
these leaders and this phenomenon. Instead of outlining certain characteristics that many populist
governments share, I present a theory of populism as a movement that emerges under certain
political conditions. What defines populism is not a specific ideology, but rather the way in
which populist leaders attain power and stay in power. When the relationship between a
government (the leaders and institutions) no longer satisfies a large constituency of the
population, this creates a space for a populist leader to appeal to this underserved community.
The populist leader uses certain tactics – mostly rhetorical – to demonstrate to the constituency
the shortcomings of the current administration and how s/he can better appeal to this group. If
the leader relates to the group, convincing ‘the people’ that s/he better represents its needs, s/he
will succeed. After election, populist leaders attempt to maintain the relationship they have
cultivated, instituting reforms that benefit the constituency – or at least give ‘the people’ more
political agency. This next section will discuss the following features that all populist movements
share, which make it an identifiable mode of governance. Specifically, that they can all be
characterized as movements, rather than ideologies and that these movements emerge because of
a deficient political system that allows a populist leader to emerge. Though conditions may exist
in which populist can flourish, without a leader to mobilize ‘the people’, the movement will not
manifest. This movement needs a leader who both separates himself/herself from the current
administrations and also cultivates a special relationship between himself/herself and ‘the
people’ thus creating an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. Finally, once elected the leader institutes
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reforms that solidify his/her relationship with the people, giving them more autonomy via
increased political participation.
Daniel Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell define populism as “an ideology which pits a
virtuous and homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together
depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values,
prosperity, identity and voice”8 For them, populism is an “ideology” and therefore exists as a set
of beliefs. I disagree with this term “ideology.” Ideology suggests a set of ideals, or a manner of
thinking. Rather than an ideology, populism represents a style of politics. An ideology suggests
that all populist movements base their movements upon the same tenets; however, looking at
various populist movements we that this is not the case. What connects all populist movements –
unlike an ideology like Liberalism, or Marxism – is the way the leaders relate to the ‘people’,
come to power and operate. Populism emerges out of a deficient political system that fails to
serve a large homogenous set of the population, and is therefore more spontaneous and organic
than an ideology. For example, the failure of the Argentine government to address the needs of
the new industrial class facilitated Juan Perón’s populist movement. The government did not
address the needs of this new working class by limiting union efforts to raise wages and
prohibiting the existence of the Confederación General de Trabajo del Republica Argentina – a
major labor union.9 Because of the inability of the government to address this large
constituency’s need a space opened for Perón to mobilize these people, and create his populist
movement. Therefore, it emerges out of necessity – because they system has reached a point that

8

Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, "The Sceptre and the Spectre," introduction to
Twenty-First Century Populism, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),3.
9
Jeremy Adelman, “Reflections on Argentine Labour and the Rise of Chávez.”Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 11 (3 Sep., 1992): 247.
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allows a populist leader to emerge and create or organize ‘‘the people’’. All other populist
movements are cultivated under similar conditions.
Unlike an ideology like Marxism or liberalism, specific ideals or tenets cannot be applied
to all populist governments. Rather, each regime conforms to the perceived needs of its ‘people’.
Specifically, populism conforms to the platform of its leader. Yves Mény and Yves Surel put it
well, calling populism an “empty shell which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is
poured into it.”10 Populism conforms to the platform of its leader. Therefore, without the ability
to pinpoint specific policies or ideals unique to all populist regimes, defining populism is more
difficult than other government types. Paul Taggart put it aptly when he said: “populism has an
essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on the hue of the environment it occurs
in.”11 Though theorists define it as an ideology, populism is best described as a style of
governance that emerges in certain conditions. I think understanding populism not as an
ideology, but rather as a style of politics is essential for reaching an accurate definition. Once
certain political or economic platforms are uniformly assigned to all populist governments, these
theories of populism lose resilience. Understanding each populist movement apart from its
specific beliefs provides a much clearer, more accurate and lasting understanding of the
phenomenon.
Many theorists have related populism to a specific economic climate, theorizing that it
emerges during periods of industrialization or modernization. For example, Germani sees
populism as a “deviation in the standard path from traditional to modern society”12 Lasch sees it

10

Yves Mény and Yves Surel, "The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism," in Democracies and
the Populist Challenge, by Yves Mény and Yves Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 6.
11
Paul Taggart, introduction to Populism, (Philadelphia: Open University Press), 4.
12
Taggart, Populism, 15.
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as a “response to the crisis of modernity”.13 Shils believes that populism represents “the tension
between metropolis and province”.14 By placing this type of restriction on populist governments,
certain leaders that I would categorize as populist do not fit the mold. Populist governments have
flourished during periods of modernization, but it is not a necessary component for a government
to be considered populist. In short, industrialization came and went; populism persists. For
example, the populist movements in Western European countries as well as Sarah Palin’s foray
demonstrate that developed countries also produce this regime type. We have seen the
institutionalization of populist regimes in Western Europe – an economically developed area of
the world – during the twenty-first century, proving that populism is not limited to moments of
modernization. Looking to Italy, Berlusconi’s government falls under the populist umbrella. Like
other populist leaders he presents himself as part of ‘the people’ and not of the government
“Berlusconi acts as if complicit with his audience, with the aim of appearing as the only sincere
and worthy interpreter of what the man in the street thinks.”15 In Italy the ‘man in the street’ does
not equate to the rural farmers unable to adapt to the quickly modernizing society, but rather the
“middle class which he has never severed ties with” and “the most disadvantaged of the common
people whom the parties and unions of the left have abandoned”16 The populist people can take
on many forms. Economic constraints limit the populist people to ‘the poor’, which does not
include these other groups.
Because rapid modernization causes rapid change, especially for certain established
classes, some think populism acts as a backlash to modernization and a push for a return to
13

Benjamin Arditi, “Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics,” in Populism and
the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (New York: Verso 2005), 72.
14
Panizza, Populism and the Mirror, 4.
15
Marco Tarchi, “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms,” in Twenty First Century Populism, ed.
Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 94.
16
Tarchi, “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms,” 95.
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traditional lifestyle. I think that periods of modernization created a climate in which populism
had the chance to flourish, but it is not a necessary factor. For example, as the U.S. moved away
from an agrarian economy, the farmers felt displaced and underserved by the government, which
focused on railroad and merchant interests.17 Any time a large homogenous group – like farmers
– can ban together, believing that their government has failed them, a populist regime can form.
Therefore, in times of modernization, especially industrialization, large segments of the
population felt neglected thus fostering the perfect environment for the populist leader to create a
movement. However, modernization is not the only climate in which large homogonous
populations can feel underserved thus creating a populist movement. Often, populist movements
do emerge during times of economic unrest because groups blame their economic plight on the
government’s failures. For example, the economic oil crisis in Venezuela helped Chávez’s
populist platform because it created a space for his figure to emerge. The poorest people felt the
economic failures most and blamed the wealthy political elites, who relied on oil revenues, for
their situation.18 This distance allowed Chávez to emerge, organize a homogenized poor
population, and run his anti-establishment platform.
Demonstrating how these economic ideologies fail to translate to all populist movements
illustrates the danger in designating populism as an ideology. No specific economic or political
ideology characterizes all populist governments, but rather, conditions that create a dissatisfied
homogenous group suffice. More important than what types of climates cause a populist leader
to emerge is the fact that a large underserved group exists. For populist movements to rise, a
leader must have access to significant homogonizable group because a key component to
17

Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History, Volume Two Second Edition, (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 2004).
18
Ronald Sylvia, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” Third World
Quarterly, 24, no. 1 (February 2003): 65.
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populism is the existence of a populist ‘people’. Or rather, the special relationship the populist
leader creates between himself/herself and his/her designated people is essential to the
movement. Rickard Lalander presents perhaps the most basic understanding of this relationship:
“el populismo se caracteriza por la interacción directa entre el pueblo y la elite (o el pueblo y el
líder).” [Populism is characterized by the direct interaction between the ‘pueblo’ (people) and the
elite (or ‘‘the people’’ and the leader)].19 For Lalander, the key aspect to populism lies in the
direct relationship between ‘the people’ and leader. In populist movements, leaders define ‘the
people’ and form a distinct relationship with said ‘people’. Specifically, they use rhetoric to
present themselves as of ‘the people’ and therefore better able to represent ‘the people’. By
including themselves as a part of ‘the people’, ‘the people’ feel more connected to this leader
than the current “elite” establishment. Demonstrating the underrepresentation of this mass (their
people), they then claim to represent the mass in a more legitimate, meaningful and some might
say democratic way. Populist leaders cultivate this direct leadership first by using rhetoric to
relate to their people. They try to legitimate their position, luring their people using their
language and including themselves as a part of ‘the people’. After winning over their
constituency they then solidify a more direct relationship by removing barriers to political
participation instituting more direct forms of participation like referenda.20
By defining their people, the leaders create ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomies in their
societies. The more economic focused philosophies claim populism always forms a ‘rural’ versus
‘urban’ or a ‘rich’ versus ‘poor’ distinction. This understanding limits populism to too narrow a

19

Rickard Lalander, “Algunas reflexiones sobre populismo, descentralización y Chavismo,” Red
de Revistas Científicas de América Latina, y el Caribe, España y Portugal 48 (Spring 2004): 9.
20
Referenda are not a necessary feature of all populist governments; however, populist leaders
must institute reforms that create a more direct democratic process. Often these leaders use
referenda because they allow ‘the people’ more political participation and agency.
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lens. Yes, certain populist movements, like the United States People’s Party of the 19th Century,
did divide society into a rural (farmers) and urban (merchants, railroad and industrial interests),
but not all populist movements rely on this divide. However, the ‘people’ and its ‘other’ do not
always have to reflect ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ differences, but can reflect other distinctions. For
example, in Argentina Populism stressed the role of the urban worker; in Bolivia Morales
focuses on the indigenous people. These other definitions confine Populism to a specific time
period in which societies industrialize and develop. As demonstrated by current populist
movements, a society’s stage of development does not determine if a populist movement will
emerge. Populist governments are more about a rejection of the current administration’s inability
to address ‘the people’s’ needs and wants – a reaction to misrepresentation and underrepresentation – rather than a reaction to modernization. Therefore, the dichotomization depends
on the circumstances in which the populist movement emerges and cannot be limited to ‘rich’
versus ‘poor’.
The way in which the leader operates is essential to populism, therefore, without the
leader populism could not exist. Ernesto Laclau presents a similar perspective suggesting
populism manifests because of an ideology of the elite “[populism] occurs when one fraction of
the dominant class seeks to establish hegemony but is unable to do so and so makes a direct
appeal to the masses.”21 Unlike other definitions, Laclau believes that elites cause populist
movements to develop. I agree with Laclau that populism emerges from the rhetoric of an elite.
Unlike Laclau I do not think that this occurs because a dominant class cannot establish
hegemony without the masses. The elite – or rather, the leader – understands the inability of the
current administration to appeal to ‘the people’ and then organizes ‘the people’ by presenting

21

Taggart, Populism, 17.
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himself/herself as an alternative to the establishment.22 Also, I believe unrest already exists
within the masses, but without elite support a populist movement could not and would not
emerge. I think that a leader who either is of ‘the people’ or claims to be of ‘the people’ uses
rhetoric to legitimize his/her position and organize the masses.
Understanding the relationship between the leader and his/her people is key to defining
populism. All populist leaders have very similar ways of cultivating this relationship.
Specifically, they must present themselves to their people in such a way that garners their trust.
One adjective that has often been used to describe populist leaders is “charismatic” or
“personalistic” I agree that a populist leader must have charisma that resonates with his/her
people, or else s/he could not maintain his/her position or his/her relationship with the masses.23
The masses relate not to a particular party or ideology, but with what the leader represents and
the way in which s/he conveys his platform. For example, during Argentina’s Juan Perón
administration, ‘the people’ related to Perón so much so that his movement received the moniker
“El Chávezismo”. Chávez defined a political movement, rather than the other way around. When
people discuss the current Venezuelan political situation, they reference Chávez – not his party
and not his movement (the Bolivian Revolution) – but the leader himself. This demonstrates that
populist movements do not rely on ideologies, but rather the leaders that create the movement.
Therefore, without a memorable or engaging personality, these leaders would lose their

22

I use the term ‘establishment’ in reference to the parties and people who hold political power.
The populist leader refers to this group as a cohesive homogenous group and tries to oppose their
power by creating a populist movement. Though they may not necessarily be a homogenous
group that acts in unison, I choose to refer to them as such because this is how populist leaders
operate.
23
Kenneth Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin American: The
Peruvian Case”, World Politics 48 (October 1995): 84.
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connection to ‘the people’. Since populism relies on this relationship, without this specific
personality type populism would fail.
The special relationship between the leader and the led also relies on the way in which
the leader came to power. The leader must appear as a “political-outsider” – in the sense that
they do not belong to institutionalized parties. Though Roberts claims the leader must bypass
well-established institutions to gain power, as long as the leader presents himself/herself as
outside of the institutionalized parties at the time, s/he can maintain the image he needs.24
Certain populist leaders – Huge Chávez, Evo Morales – have come to power using elections,
which is an institutionalized form of representation. Though these leaders worked within the
existing political system, utilizing the election process to gain power, they still present
themselves as separate from the ruling administration.
More importantly than how the leader comes to power, is the way s/he is perceived in
relation to the establishment. The masses have a resentful relationship with the established
masses, therefore the leader must challenge this established political and economic elite. The
leader must do this because ‘the people’ feel wronged, betrayed or unrepresented by this elite.
Since ‘the people’ lost trust in the current administration, they rely on a leader who they perceive
as separate from the corrupt government. Without this relationship between elites and masses,
the leader would not succeed in mobilizing his populist movement. Some believe the masses
must oppose a long-established differentiated ruling class. Earlier populist movements opposed
long established ruling classes; however, it is not necessary that the leader oppose a very
established regime.25 As long as the populist leader comes from outside the current political

24

Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism”, World Politics, 84.
Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American
Security Policies (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), 100-101.
25
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establishment, s/he can present himself/herself legitimately to his people. For example, consider
Argentina’s Carlos Menem who came to power after the unpopular Raul Alfonsín. As the first
democratically elected president of Argentina after the military regime, Alfonsín did not come
from a long-established party system. However, Menem still appeared as a political outsider in
the way he presented his political platform to ‘the people’. As long as the leader presents
himself/herself to the electorate as distinct from the current dominant political establishment,
s/he maintains his special relationship with ‘the people’ and is considered a populist leader. Also,
I think this underestimates the importance of the leader’s role. Without the leader to define and
organize ‘the people’, the populist movement could not succeed.
Not only do all populist leaders have certain commonalities, but also the populist ‘people’
has specific shared characteristics. The leader presents himself/herself in the specific ways
outlined above in order to win over his/her ‘people’. I have referred to the populist people as an
“underserved homogenous group”. Though the populist leader essentially defines his/her people,
using rhetoric and the above outlined methods (presenting himself as a political outsider, as one
of ‘the people’), ‘the people’ has to relate to one another on some level too, or else the leader
would not succeed. I suggest that this group must be homogonous because the leader refers to
his/her people as a homogenous entity, and if the leader hopes to succeed electorally, ‘the
people’ has to give into his/her rhetoric. For example, Morales discusses his constituency as the
indigenous population. Using this term homogenizes his/her constituency. Since, the Bolivian
indigenous people can relate to each other on this cultural level and also to the leader, Morales
has succeeded. The leader demonstrates to this homogenous group that the current establishment
has not served the group’s needs as a whole. If the group were not homogenous, these methods
would be less effective. Since the leader presents himself/herself as both a political outsider and
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as a part of said ‘people’, ‘the people’ trust the leader. Since the leader relies on the rhetoric of
the ‘people’, if his/her people are not homogenous then the methods he uses to gain legitimacy
will fail. For example, if Sarah Palin defines to her ‘people’ as “middle America” but no such
homogenous group exists in the United States, she cannot succeed. ‘The people’ must relate to
each other and the leader.
I also use the term underserved, because ‘the people’ must feel betrayed by the current
establishment.26 Without this sentiment, ‘the people’ would not feel the need to go beyond
political norms and elect the populist leader. Again, this group must be homogenous because of
the way the leader addresses this people. For example, when Morales claims he represents the
true indigenous will, not only does he wish to demonstrate that he (an indigenous leader) should
politically represent his people, but he also wants to demonstrate that the current establishment
does not address indigenous people’s needs. Not only is the current establishment not a part of
the homogenous ‘people’ but also it only addresses its own elite needs. Therefore, in that sense,
the ‘people’ feel underserved. For example, the poor majority in Venezuela feels betrayed by the
wealthy oil elite that uses oil revenues to perpetuate its own wealth instead of providing services
for the poor. Or the Bolivian establishment neglects its indigenous population, not recognizing
their country’s cultural diversity.
My theory of populism avoids confining the definition to any specific ideals, locations or
economic climates. What populist governments share in common does not stem from these
restrictions, but rather from the way the relationship between government/political
elite/institutions and ‘the people’. If this relationship is imbalanced in favor of the government,
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this creates a climate in which populism can emerge. Though a populist government will not
necessarily emerge, these conditions allow a leader to facilitate his/her populist movement. As
long as the leader can manipulate a large homogenous people to follow him/her – using the
methods described above – then these conditions will allow him/her to succeed. After wooing
his/her people, the leader then solidifies his/her relationship by instituting certain reforms that
allow more direct participation of ‘the people’.
With this clearer understanding of populism we now understand how populist regimes
form and operate. Looking at some contemporary examples will help clarify what populism
looks like in action. I will look at Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez to
demonstrate how they exemplify populism. Then, I will turn to the United States and Sarah
Palin, to see if she falls into the populist category and what that means in an American context
(versus a Latin American context). Though I focus on modern Latin American governments, my
definition above extends to the American agrarian populist movements of the early 20th century,
to more traditional Latin American populist governments – like Argentina’s Juan Perón – to
modern Western European governments, like Italy’s Berlusconi administration. Though my
definition is not limited to a specific time period, or region, I am choosing to look at Bolivia and
Venezuela because they represent modern populist moments. I want to compare Sarah Palin to
these leaders because she also might represent a modern populist figure and it is useful to
compare her political moves to those of other modern leaders. By looking at these two leaders
juxtaposed with Palin, we can see if Palin has any chance to succeed as a modern American
populist leader.
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III.

THE POPULIST LEADER

After delineating a theoretical understanding of populism, analyzing contemporary
examples demonstrates how the theoretical understanding correlates with the way populism
operates in the real world. While populist governments consist of more than their leaders, I
choose to focus on how the populist leader functions because populism essentially relies on the
leader: without a leader to catalyze the movement it could not exist. The leader defines his/her
people then uses his rhetoric and a platform that will appeal to his/her people to get elected, thus
creating his movement. Though each populist leader uses a different message, each leader
employs similar tactics to gain the trust and votes of his/her people. This section will outline the
steps populist leaders take to ensure their success. After presenting a general understanding of
the way these leaders gain power, I will show how both Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez fit into
this framework. Having followed similar trajectories both Morales and Chávez gained the favor
of their people to become president of their countries. While showing the ways in which their
political/populist moves led them to the presidency, I will also analyze Sarah Palin’s current
political position. Unlike Morales and Chávez, Palin is not yet president. Yet, not only have
‘draft Palin for president’ web sites already formed, but also in a February 7th interview Palin
admitted she “would be willing” to challenge current U.S. president Barack Obama for the 2012
US Presidency.27 By closely analyzing Palin’s moves thus far, alongside her populist
contemporaries, I can not only show how she does and does not fit within the populist
framework but also predict if she will have the same successes as other modern populists.
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Populist leaders are charismatic political outsiders who successfully challenge the status
quo (institutions, parties, economic policies) claiming to represent to true will of ‘the people’.
Being a political outsider helps justify the populist leader’s position as one of ‘the people’. ‘The
people’ believes the current government unsatisfactorily meets their needs and the populist
leader has arrived to represent these unattended citizens. To do this they appeal to a
disenfranchised ‘people’, pitting ‘the people’s will’ against the institutionalized political elite,
creating an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. Specifically, they use rhetoric claiming that they
represent the true will of ‘the people’, unlike the current elitist leaders and institutions. After
using this type of populist rhetoric, to fulfill their promise to ‘the people’, populist leaders give
‘power’ back to ‘the people’ not only via their representation, but also by instituting reforms that
incorporate ‘the people’. For example, Chávez used referenda when trying to change the
Venezuelan constitution, giving the people a voice. Populist leaders claim that since they come
from ‘the people’ and represent the interests of ‘the people’, acting as ‘the people’s’
representative gives political power back to ‘the people’. Additionally, once elected populists
institute referenda, initiatives and recall giving more direct autonomy to ‘the people’. For
example, under Evo Morales, Bolivians approved a new constitution via referendum that grants
more power and legitimacy to the indigenous majority.28 Similarly, Hugo Chávez has used the
referendum to change certain parts of the Venezuelan constitution, including the elimination of
presidential term limits in a 2009 vote.
Before granting more agency to ‘the people’ via reforms, the leader has to convince ‘the
people’ to elect him/her. One way the leaders win over their constituency is to distance
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themselves from the current government demonstrating that they essentially have nothing to do
with the status quo. Since ‘the people’ is not satisfied with the existing state of affairs, this
positioning helps the populist’s image. As a political outsider, populist leaders not only separate
themselves from the “corrupt” establishment, but also claim to be of ‘the people’ – unlike the
elitist rulers. For example, Evo Morales embodied this type of anti-establishment leader on many
levels. From 1985 to 1997 the three major competing parties in Bolivian elections included:
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) and
Moviemiento Nacional de Izquierda (MIR). In 1997 the ADN collapsed (with the death of its
founder), leaving a fragmented party system. This led to an alliance between the MNR, MIR and
what remained of the ADN, against burgeoning anti-systemic parties including Morales’s
indigenous based coca workers party: Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS).29 Therefore, as MAS’s
leader, Morales embodies an anti-establishment figure; however, Morales’s position as a political
outsider extends beyond his party affiliation. In 2002 due to involvement in violent
demonstrations against the government’s coca eradication policy, the Bolivian Congress voted
for his expulsion further emphasizing his disassociation with government bureaucracy. Finally
his Aymara roots and poor upbringing give Morales more legitimacy with his constituents and
outsider status as an anti-elitist. Populist leaders use these elements to appeal to their constituents
claiming that they do not operate within the corrupt political establishment and represent the true
interests of ‘the people’.
Looking to Venezuela, Chávez also used similar strategies to present himself as a
political outsider. Before assuming the presidency representing his party the MVR in 1998, the
Acción Democratica (AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente
29
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(COPEI) dominated the Venezuelan political scene. In 1958 the two parties established a type of
loyalty with one another when they signed the “Punto Fijo” pact, an agreement in which the two
parties agreed to share partisan power and patronage, and therefore the two parties controlled
Venezuelan politics. Over the years Venezuelan politicians instituted policies that made the
Venezuelan economy dependent on petroleum revenues.30 However, once petroleum prices fell,
the economy began to suffer causing a socio-cultural shift of people from rural to urban areas
looking for work. This created a large dissatisfied mass that could act as the perfect targets of
Chávez’s anti-establishment populist platform. Yet even before Chávez’s presidency, in 1989 the
Venezuelan people elected Carlos Andrés Perez (AD) as president. Perez instituted neo-liberal
reforms that privatized state companies and eliminated gas subsidies, which had long maintained
domestic petroleum prices far beneath their international levels (and beneath the production costs
of gasoline). Upon the elimination of the subsidy oil prices rose by as much 100%, and
subsequently, the costs of public transportation rose by 30%.31 Since Perez’s reforms failed to
improve Venezuela’s economy, poverty and economic depression continued and with that the
frustration of the poor only increased. This frustration culminated with the violent “caracazo”
riots that occurred as a reaction to a sharp increase in transportation costs.
After these riots the Venezuelan government lost the stability it had for the last 30 years.
In 1992 Hugo Chávez entered the political scene and the eyes of ‘the people’ after attempting a
failed coup on the Perez administration. With this move Chávez presented himself as both
charismatic and also a political outsider. Representing the Movimiento Bolivariano
Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200) – the predecessor of the MVR – Chávez showed Venezuelans
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he came from a different political ideology/establishment than the current administration. The
coup event caused Chávez’s imprisonment, therefore putting Chávez in a national spotlight that
created a lasting impression of Chávez’s figure on the Venezuelan people’s mind. From this
point on the Venezuelan people viewed Chávez as a figure that stood up to government
corruption, unlike the established parties.
In 1998 the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) party ran Chávez as their candidate.
Beyond relying on his credibility that he had gained from his coup attempt 6 years earlier, he
used his campaign platform to further present himself as a political outsider. First and foremost
he ran under a divergent party: the MVR. But he went beyond his party affiliation presenting
himself not only as a political outsider, but also as anti-elite. As one of Chávez’s first campaign
promises he vowed to begin his presidency abolishing Venezuela's old “Punto Fijo” political
system. This promise not only further distanced Chávez from the establishment, but also
demonstrated his anti-elite sentiments. With this reform Chávez emphasized his anti-corruption.
Venezuelans distrusted the two established parties. By abolishing the system upon which they
functioned, Chávez signaled his loyalty not to bureaucracy, but to his people. He also ran on an
anti-poverty campaign. A country with a substantial amount of oil wealth, Venezuela has a sharp
distinction between the poor masses and the very few very wealthy ruling class. The poor
majority distrusted the elite class blaming them for their failure to serve the needs of ‘the
people’. Chávez promised to institute social welfare reforms. Again, Chávez presents himself as
a political outsider because he is both not of the elite and also aligned with ‘the people’.
Like her contemporaries, Morales and Chávez, does Sarah Palin qualify as a political
outsider? If so, does her position align her closer to ‘the people’? Certainly her resignation as
Alaskan governor signals a move away from the political establishment. In fact, her resignation

26
speech alludes to this shift claiming she is “not wired to operate under the same old ‘politics as
usual’” and that she chose “the right path… even though it is unconventional and not so
comfortable.”32 For Palin, the “same old politics as usual” indicate “what's wrong - many just
accept that lame duck status, hit the road, draw the paycheck, and ‘milk it’.”33 In other words,
Palin expresses her frustration with the American political establishment distancing herself from
this bureaucracy. Though stepping down often signifies a leave of absence from politics, Palin
admits that her “choice is to take a stand and effect change,”34 signaling that she will not remove
herself from politics, but rather operate outside the current (and in her opinion bureaucratic)
institutions. Simply maintaining an image as a political outsider, however, does not qualify Palin
as a populist. Populist’s use their positioning to portray themselves as politicians more aligned
with ‘the people’. In Morales’s case he clearly represents the underserved indigenous population
and uses his status as a MAS leader to appeal to this constituency. By distancing herself, has
Palin aligned herself closer to a distinct ‘people’? The New Yorker claims “she represents the
erasure of any distinction between the governing and the governed” appealing to “whites who are
feeling under siege by changing economic and cultural conditions.”35 Arguably, her current bus
tour brings her closer to this constituency (she is scheduled to tour small Midwestern towns and a
few small cities on the East Coast)36; however, the ‘people’ Palin appeals to is not easily defined
(or as electorally significant) as Morales’s followers.
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As Palin aligns herself with the emergent Tea Party Movement, she continues to present
herself as a political outsider. Like other populist leaders she is positioning herself within politics
but not via the traditional parties (in the American case: the Democrats or the Republicans). In an
interview with Fox News Palin discusses why she feels the need to move away from the
traditional system toward this new party
Because both major parties, the "D" and the "R"s have both kind of lost their way
in some respects… when the GOP strays from the planks in the platform, a
people's movement like the Tea Party movement is invited in to kind of hold these
politicians accountable again and remind them of their constitutional limits there
on the federal level and it's a beautiful movement.37
Here Palin, like Morales, Chávez and other populist leaders demonstrates her general distrust of
the current ‘corrupt’ political system, which in her opinion needs to be changed. Characteristic of
populist movements, Palin presents the solution to this political failure via a call to ‘‘the
people’’.38 In her keynote speech at the February 2010 Tea Party convention Palin proclaimed,
“The soul of this movement [the Tea Party Movement] is ‘the people’—everyday Americans
who grow our food and run our small businesses, and teach our kids, and fight our wars. They’re
folks in small towns and cities across this great nation who saw what was happening.”39 Here
Palin presents a populist notion of ‘the people’ by defining them as “everyday Americans who
grow our food and run our small businesses, and teach our kids, and fight our wars.” The
difference between Palin’s conception of ‘the people’ and the other leaders I have looked at
(Morales, Chávez, Chávez) is that hers is not as clearly delineated. Via Morales we understand
‘the people’ as the indigenous and for Chávez ‘the poor’, but Palin just depicts the ‘average
37
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American’ as ‘the people’ without much further clarification. The next section will look more
carefully at how each of these leaders addresses his/her ‘people’ and how that fits within both a
populist and democratic framework.
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IV.

ANALYZING POPULISM AS A DEMOCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE

Undeniably, the notion of ‘the people’ is an important aspect of both populism and
democracy. Sarah Palin, Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez all use the ideology of ‘the people’ to
justify their political and democratic legitimacy. But beyond rhetoric of the people, what is the
relationship populism has to democracy? After examining democracy and representation, to
answer this question I make the following claims. Populism, as a form of representation, fits into
a democratic framework; however, its type of representation differs from that of liberal
democracy. Second, though populism presents an alternative to liberal democracy, it does not
improve upon it but rather represents a perversion of democracy. Finally, I demonstrate that
populism does in fact relate to liberal democracy pointing to Margaret Canovan’s theory, which
suggests that populism acts as a shadow of liberal democracy.
Populist rhetoric demonstrates that the leaders believe they act as democratic
representatives, representing the true will of ‘the people’. Though Evo Morales said in his
election speech “I believe only in the power of ‘the people’, he not only means ‘the people’s’
power to elect him as their representative but also their increased political participation. Once
elected the leader demonstrates this belief, creating a more direct process by electing to give
them more autonomy via measures like referendum. But even if ‘the people’ are more involved
after his election, the populist leader ultimately represents his/her ‘people’. This type of
representation does not discount the populist leader’s democratic legitimacy, but further
examination reveals that the way populist leaders represent their constituency warps the
democratic understanding of ‘representative (liberal) democracy.’ Meny and Surel point out that
“democracy was made possible in practical terms through the unexpected combination of
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popular sovereignty and the representative principle.”40 In democracy a tension exists between
popular sovereignty – the will of ‘the people’ – and representation – institutions and elected
officials. Liberal democracies rely on institutions and representation more than popular
sovereignty. In liberal democracy, popular sovereignty manifests via elections, or public opinion,
or theoretically the ability to run for office. Populist regimes, however, depend much more on
popular sovereignty, not only having ‘the people’ elect their leader but also instituting reforms
that facilitate more direct forms of democratic participation, like referendums. Reforms that
incorporate ‘the people’s’ participatory power represents a more direct model because the people
do not go through institutions to indicate their preferences. Therefore, theoretically, little
difference between popular sovereignty and representation exists in populist regimes because the
leader comes from ‘the people’, allowing them to act for themselves. In fact, populist leaders
speak as if the ‘representative principle’ does not matter and believe democracy means the power
of ‘the people’ and only the power of ‘the people’. Given this one-sided approach to democracy
populism removes some aspect of representation, leaving popular sovereignty to dominate.
Ultimately ‘the people’ elect the populist leader as their representative, meaning these
leaders maintain some level of representation. Representation is an important aspect of
democracy because it maintains the incorporation of individuals (the voters) but it also delegates
power to more qualified individuals than the ‘common people’. Thinking of the populist leader
as ‘the people’s’ representative suggests populism fits with this democratic understanding of
populism. However, upon further analysis, the way the populist leader represents his/her people
is distinct from our liberal democratic notion of representation. Using Benjamin Arditi’s
understanding of different types of representation, populism falls under a category that does not
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correlate with democratic ideology. Arditi defines representation three ways: rendering present,
acting for others, or acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them.
Populism presents a very ambiguous type of representation. Populist leaders maintain that they
speak in the name of ‘the people’, use their language and give a voice to those who have no
voice.41 Though populist leaders claim to do this, there are two issues with this mode of
representation vis-à-vis liberal democracy. First, liberal democracy’s kind of representation tries
to represent all people, whereas the populist understanding of ‘the people’ does not represent the
entire electorate, but rather a specific, alienating group of people. Ultimately liberal democracy
relies on the majority, but unlike populist modes of representation all citizens as voters are
included in the ideology of ‘the people’: no one is in excluded by virtue of race, class, etc. On the
other hand, populism excludes the voices of those parts of the electorate that are not part of the
‘genuine people’. For example, when Evo Morales states that he believes in the power of ‘the
people’ he does not mean the entire Bolivian electorate, but rather a specific subset of the
Bolivian population: the indigenous.
In addition to whom these leaders represent, there is also a problem with the way
populist leaders ‘represent’ these people. Representation means there is a gap between the actual
people and their representatives – this is the difference between presenting oneself and having
representation. In populism, “a similar ambiguity surrounds the gap between the absent present
of ‘the people’ and the action of representing them. The gap is bridged by a ‘presentation’ that
forgets the iterability at work in the ‘re-‘ of representation.”42 Populist leaders do not exhibit a
form of representation because they remove the gap between ‘the people’ and the leader – so
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there is no absence, but a joint presence without any representation. Additionally, the leader acts
as the vehicle for the expression of the popular will. Rather than taking public opinion into
account and then acting as a more educated political actor, the populist leader claims he
expresses ‘the people’s’ will, which once again dissolves this gap between represented and
representatives. Populist leaders act as incarnations of ‘the people’, rather than their
representative. As the embodiment of ‘the people’, the leader has a different function than a
representative, and therefore populism exemplifies an artificial type of representation.
Although these populist societies maintain some semblance of representation, further
examination reveals that they represent a perversion of democracy. Since populists rely on their
rhetoric to define and essentially win over ‘the people’ they “can be considered an ideological
corruption of democracy if we consider that democracy, founded upon transmissible principles,
implies, in Proudhon’s words, the willingness to teach and educate ‘the people’ rather than to
seduce it.”43 This argument suggests that the way in which populist leaders approach ‘the people’
corrupts this democratic principle of personal enlightenment and does not present a true
manifestation of ‘popular will’. Therefore, populist governments foster an artificial type of
popular sovereignty. The leader “seduces” ‘the people’, convincing them they govern themselves
(through the leader), when really this rhetoric does not maximize participation but rather
persuades ‘the people’ to vote for a leader that makes the decisions.
Contesting this point, Benjamin Arditi believes the populist style of persuasion does not
differ from that of most elected leaders. These leaders rely on simple rhetoric to reduce the
complexity of the issues presented to the electorate in order to appeal to ‘the people’ and
ultimately get elected. Arditi argues that this “seems to be characteristic of contemporary politics
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generally”, meaning that it does not necessarily demonstrate how populism fails to truly
represent ‘the people’ since many elected leaders use these rhetorical tactics .44 While democratic
leaders use rhetoric that simplifies issues, populists – unlike other democratically elected leaders
– use very specific rhetoric of ‘the people’ to gain legitimacy and power. As discussed earlier,
they legitimize their rule by defining their people and then claiming to represent the true will of
‘the people’. While other democratic leaders simplify issues and use means of persuasion,
populist leaders rely on this understanding of popular sovereignty for validation. In a sense, all
elected leaders need to present their issues in a way that all people can understand, but not all
leaders use the specific populist rhetoric of ‘the people’ to get elected. This differentiates
populist leaders and other democratic leaders demonstrating that populist rhetoric corrupts the
democratic ideal of popular sovereignty.
Comparing populism’s specific type of representation to that of liberal democracy
demonstrates that populism presents a distinct form of representation that is not more democratic
than liberal democracy, and in fact is a worse type of representation. In liberal democracies the
electorate chooses its leaders who then make decisions on behalf of their constituency. Though
leaders hopefully represent the interests of the general will, this model has certain inherent elitist
qualities. First, those who have enough social and economic capital to become representatives,
and actually make decisions, come from elite backgrounds. Second, those choosing the leaders
have varying levels of access and education, making it easier for the elite to participate and make
educated choices. Finally, the elite runs the government and its institutions. This elite run
government often fails to recognize the needs of its more marginalized constituents, and often
becomes self-serving, only addressing those who have more economic and political capital.
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Democratic leaders base their decisions on perceived public opinion, which is often defined by
those with more money to lobby or more political capital to involve themselves in the process.
This elitism contradicts the democratic principle that leaders should make decisions that reflect
the general will – not the will of those with most agency and access. The populist type of
representation, which claims to represent the true will of the people and also facilitates more
participation of all people (not just the elite), attempts to present a more accessible government
for all. Theoretically populism advocates for a more inclusive type of democracy, but my
analysis has shown that this type of representation only feigns greater inclusion. This façade
therefore makes populism a worse type of democratic representation.
Margaret Canovan expands upon this notion of populism as a counter to liberal
democracy’s elitism. Outlining two styles of democracy – redemptive and pragmatic – she
claims that populism arises in the gap between the two, acting as democracy’s shadow. In other
words, Canovan believes populism demonstrates the tension of democracy’s simultaneous
celebration and skepticism of ‘the people’. She concludes that when the gap “between haloed
democracy and the grubby business of politics, populists tend to move on to the vacant territory,
promising in place of the dirty world of party maneuvering the shining ideal of democracy
renewed.’45 For Canovan the tension of democracy produces a gap, and when the gap widens
populism arises as a response to an asymmetry from the excess of pragmatism and a deficit of
redemption. In other words, the government relies too heavily on institutions and not enough on
the participation/public opinion of ‘the people’. As the institutions and the representatives – or in
other words – the elite become too bureaucratic and self-serving, populist leaders have an
opportunity to rally ‘the people’. They use the current situation to identify the problem with
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representation and institutions. Using the ideal of popular sovereignty – or referencing the
redemptive side of democracy – the populist leaders demonstrate that the current administration
does not incorporate the voice of ‘the people’.
Canovan’s theory suggests populism acts as a corrective method or at least a reaction to
elitist democratic institutions and modes of representation. While Canovan’s terminology of ‘the
shadow’ suggests this reaction is negative, Benjamin Arditi expands this theory calling populism
a specter of democracy.46 Criticizing Canovan’s terminology, Arditi thinks a specter can have
both positive and negative implications, whereas shadow implies something that necessarily
haunts democracy. For Arditi, populism manifests in three ways, each mode compatible with his
terminology. First it manifests as a means of representation reconcilable with the liberaldemocratic understanding of representation. Second, it represents a mode of participation – a
more direct democracy that relies on the direct participation of ‘the people’. Finally, it can have a
haunting aspect – like Canovan’s shadow – in which leaders use the rhetoric of ‘the people’ and
resort to authoritarianism. For example, Hitler’s appeal to and manipulation of the Aryan people
justified his resort to authoritarianism; therefore putting him in this last category. Incompatible
with democracy in any way, this facet of populism demonstrates how this seemingly democratic
appeal to ‘the people’ can degrade into very undemocratic practices.
According to Canovan and Arditi populism is an inherent part of democracy, acting as a
shadow or a specter. I disagree with Arditi’s more optimistic notion that populism can manifest
as both a positive or negative specter. Agreeing with Canovan’s shadow, my claim is that
populism always represents a warped version of democracy, “the very ‘ideology’ of democracy,
its normative content that contemplates ‘the power of the people’ and suggests that political
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power must be exercised ‘for the people’ may lead, under some circumstances and through a
distorted manipulated implementation, to populist recipes, claims, outcomes.”47 As a shadow,
populist movements do address the shortcomings of liberal democracy: the elitism, the
exclusionary aspects, the marginalization and its inabilities to include or represent all segments
of society. Unfortunately, the way populism corrects for this elitism provides a less genuine type
of representation, making this corrective method worse than liberal democracy’s elitism. Though
populists use the rhetoric of democracy such as ‘the will of ‘the people’’ and ‘representation’ this
does not necessarily mean populist movements represent a pure or better form of democracy, in
fact, the ways in which populists define ‘the people’ presents an exclusionary mode of
governance incompatible with certain liberal democratic ideals. Since populist movements
homogenize ‘the people’, they exclude people from the process from the very beginning. Liberal
democracies refer to ‘the people’ as electorate, giving all people fair chance to participate.
Populist regimes demonstrate that really, these democracies do not always address all ‘the
people’; however, by correcting for this deficiency they do not present a more democratic
system. Instead, they only focus on the needs of the previously excluded group, thus alienating
the rest of the population.
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V.

POPULIST CONCEPTIONS OF ‘THE PEOPLE’

Populist leaders not only follow a similar trajectory to power, but to do this they all use
similar rhetoric that invokes ‘the people’. Analyzing this rhetoric lends insight into the way they
entice their electorate and ultimately gain power. Populist leaders, like many democratic leaders,
rely on the notion of acting as a true representation of ‘the people’. However, what makes their
rhetoric unique is though they claim to believe in the power of all people they have specific
defined criteria for who qualifies as ‘the people’, thus alienating those who do not fall within
these criteria. Looking at the way Morales and Chávez conceive of ‘the people’ demonstrates
how these two leaders often reference their respective peoples and then go on to qualify them.
Specifically Morales portrays himself as the true representative of Bolivia’s indigenous, while
Chávez believes he acts on behalf of the poor. Like Morales and Chávez, Palin also relies on this
notion; however, unlike Chávez and Morales her constituency is ill defined. Though she does
reference her people as ‘Middle Americans’, this concept does not resonate or have as much
clarity in the United States as other populist conceptions. In addition to this lack of clarity, the
way the American electorate identifies and operates differs from that of Bolivia or Venezuela,
making Palin’s populist rhetoric even less effective. I hypothesize that Palin’s rhetoric will not
lead to her success because of the way the American (or liberal democratic) notion of ‘the
people’ operates. Unfortunately, Palin is trying to enforce her populist people within a liberal
democratic society. Populism has a distinct notion of the people that differs from a liberal
democratic understanding. This section will define both the liberal democratic and populist
definitions of the people, demonstrating how they operate under different terms and thus
demonstrating why Palin’s populist politics will never lead to her electoral success.
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Before analyzing populist leaders’ usage of ‘the people’, it is useful to first understand
common liberal democratic understandings of ‘the people’. Though democratic theorists argue
about the ideal and actual expressions/definitions of ‘the people’, I choose to highlight two
different conceptions of ‘the people’ that are prominent in the theorization of liberal democratic
societies. The first understanding presents a classic, more optimistic definition of ‘the people’:
‘the people’ act as the electorate, realizing their ‘common good’ by electing representatives who
they believe will best represent their wants and needs. Since this definition might suggest that
‘the people’ have more political power than they really do, I also consider this second
conception, a more cynical or elitist model in which the elites (political leaders and
representatives) try to win over the votes of ‘the people’, but eventually decide issues. This
understanding gives elites more power than ‘the people’, yet still conceives of the people as
electorate, voting on leaders. Joseph Schumpeter outlines both of these understandings in his
famous account of contemporary democracy. Though he favors the elitist conception, he also
discusses the more optimistic version: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making ‘the people’ itself
decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its
will."48 Liberal democracy incorporates ‘the people’ allowing individuals to ‘realize the common
good’ via elections. On the other hand, Schumpeter argues for his more cynical variation
claiming, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle
for ‘the people's’ vote.”49 Having little faith in ‘the people’, Schumpeter defines an elitist notion
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of democracy, presenting ‘the people’ as commodities – just votes to be won. Rather than favor
one over the other, I take both of these broad models as understandings of ‘the people’ in liberal
democracy. Compared to the populist notion of ‘the people’, both the classical and more
understandings demonstrate a very distinct notion of ‘the people’.
While liberal democratic societies conceives of the power of ‘the people’ as an electorate
– with equal opportunity to participate via voting – analyzing the populist leader demonstrates
the differences between the power of the liberal democratic and populist people. In a speech
celebrating his election, Evo Morales proclaimed, “I believe only in the power of ‘the people’…
I have seen the importance of the power of a whole people, of a whole nation.”50 In a later speech
he makes a similar claim suggesting “the will of ‘the people’ was imposed this September and
October, and has begun to overcome the empire's cannons.”51 With statements like these Morales
voices his belief, or at least what he hopes his followers will believe, that he represents the will
of ‘the people’. When Morales references ‘the people’ he wants to generate the idea that he acts
as an accurate representation of the general will – or, in the interest of ‘the people’ as a whole,
which is not inconsistent with liberal democracy’s Classical Doctrine. However, he not only uses
rhetoric such as ‘the will of ‘the people’ was imposed’ or that he believes in ‘the power of ‘the
people’’, but he also reinforces that he specifically represents his people’s general will by
portraying himself as one of ‘the people’. In liberal democracies, the representatives are elected
because they can act as an accurate representative. Populism suggests that for a leader to most
accurately represent his people he must come from the same cultural or socioeconomic
background as his constituents. One way the populist leader convinces his people that he is one
50
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of them is by using informal terms like the Spanish word for buddy or friend, “compañeros”, to
give the impression that he is on the same level as ‘the people’.52 As discussed earlier, attempts
like these that make the populist leader appear as a political outsider more closely aligns Morales
with his constituency.
In addition to using the informal language of his people, Morales further affiliates himself
with his ‘people’ by defining the Bolivian people as the indigenous population and only the
indigenous population. This tactic differentiates the populist understanding of the people from
liberal democracy because ‘the people’ no longer references the entire electorate. For example
when Morales refers to a “whole nation” he does not mean all Bolivian voters, he means the
indigenous, the poor, the excluded, and the marginalized.53 By defining this ‘whole nation’ as
the indigenous people Morales further legitimizes his position because he can include himself as
a part of ‘the people’. In a speech given to the United Nations, Morales describes Bolivia’s
situation saying, “during the republic, we [indigenous people] were discriminated, marginalized.
They never took into account this struggle of ‘the people’s.”54 Morales, a descendent of the
indigenous Aymara can include himself as he references the struggles of Bolivia’s indigenous.
By using ‘we’ Morales emphasizes his cultural self-inclusion as one of ‘the people’ (specifically
the indigenous people). This not only legitimizes his rule, but also makes his type of
representation different than other elected rulers. Most elected rulers justify their role as ‘the
people’s’ representative because ‘the people’ elected them as officials; however, Morales –
though elected – further legitimates his role as their representative by saying he can truly
represents ‘the people’ because he is a part of ‘the people’. He justifies his claim to represent the
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voice of ‘the people’ because his voice belongs to that aggregate and therefore – he believes –
more accurately understands and represents their wants and needs.
Looking at the way the term indigenous operates in Bolivian society elucidates the
power of Morales’s rhetoric. The United Nations Group that formulated the Declaration of the
Rights of the Indigenous People defines indigenous as:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant sectors of societies . . . 55
This definition includes both direct descendents and those who choose to identify as indigenous.
Though a subjective definition most Bolivian’s associate with a clearly marked ethnic identity.
Within these guidelines, a majority (62%) of Bolivia’s population identifies as indigenous.56
Morales’s ‘people’ – the indigenous population – do represent a large part of the electorate;
however, he appeals only to the indigenous population as ‘the people’ thus alienating other
(electoral minorities) segments of the population. This definition allows Morales to succeed as a
political figure, but does not include the entire electorate. His definition of ‘the people’ alienates
and dichotomizes: he represents the indigenous (specifically the coca workers), not the ‘whole
nation’. This is inconsistent with both Morales’s language and also liberal democratic ideals that
attempt to include all individuals.
Like Morales, populist leader Hugo Chávez also uses the rhetoric of ‘the people’. During a
televised interview on the program “Jose Vicente Hoy”, Chávez uses many of the same
rhetorical devices as Morales. During one moment he declares:
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The political power that we will assume within 48 hours as the new government,
the moral power that we have been building, the intellectual power of a project for
the future of the country, all of this we will use, and not Hugo Chávez because its
not about one man exercising power. This power is dispersed among thousands
and thousands of Venezuelan citizens. All of us together have to use this power to
build a new political system.57
Like Morales, Chávez uses the inclusive terms, like “we”. Again, this legitimates his presidency
by claiming he is of ‘the people’. Second, he invokes the power of ‘the people’. Chávez claims
‘the people’ are the ones who hold the power when he says, “this power is dispersed among
thousands and thousands of Venezuelan citizens. All of us together have to use this power.” Like
Morales, Chávez presents a form of representation that blurs the line between ‘the people’ and its
representative, emphasizing the power of ‘the people’. For Chávez ‘the people’ are the important
actors.
In an interview with Aleida Guevara (the daughter of South American revolutionary Che
Guevara) Chávez outlines his definition of ‘the people’: “The concept of ‘the people’ should
always be a concrete reality, not an abstraction. For a people to exist there should be a common
consciousness among the inhabitants of a common territory, sharing a common history.”58 For
Chávez, people must share a commonality. This differs from a notion of ‘the people’ as the
electorate. Presumably the only thing the electorate shares is the power to vote for
representatives; whereas Chávez believes ‘the people’ share more than that: they share a history.
Chávez more clearly defines what history he believes the Venezuelan people share when asked
about his origins “I learned what happened to the indigenous people…. I saw what had really
happened… they slaughtered us.”59 Like Morales, Chávez aligns himself with an indigenous
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people. Given that on his father’s side he has both African and indigenous blood, he can claim to
be part of this sect “for me being indigenous means being part of the deepest and most authentic
roots of our people”60 Yet, even more than relating to the “most authentic roots of our people” he
appeals to the poor.
Chávez’s discourse… conveyed the notion that the Venezuelen government
was concerned with the well-being of the lower classes above that of any
other sector. Not only did he state that poor people needed his help and
attention more than other sectors, but he sometimes viewed class relations as
a zero-sum game. Technocratic symbols and slogans, which appealed
mostly to the middle classes, were absent in Chávez’s discourse.61
Having come from a poor family he viewed himself as one of ‘the people’, often describing
himself as a ’fish in water’.62
This populist understanding of the people differs from the people as electorate both in
the classical sense and in the more cynical sense. The American understanding of ‘the people’ as
electorate seeking representation does not dichotomize society in the way that Morales’s
understanding does. Morales focuses on a relatively homogenous group (indigenous), whereas
the United States electorate is very heterogeneous. Morales’s ‘people’ has a sense of solidarity
because they represent a community that has a shared attribute: indigenous heritage. On the other
hand the American electorate feels solidarity not because of a shared identity (like being
indigenous), but rather due to the shared understanding that they elect their leaders. Therefore,
the American and Populist understandings of ‘the people’ differ due to the ways in which each
group finds solidarity.
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Compared to the populist understanding of ‘the people’, ‘the people’ as electorate
assumes one similarity between individuals: that each voter helps realize the common good via
choosing representatives. On the other hand, populist leaders attempt to connect their people via
a shared culture, or a shared cause. For example, the indigenous movement in Bolivia relies on a
shared ethnic identity. Perón’s descamisados (workers) shared the same economic plight. This
does not align with the definition above because instead of a group amassing their individual
desires to create a ‘common will’ and hopefully realize the ‘common good’, populist peoples are
assumed to have the same ‘common will’ – the same wants and needs. Therefore the electoral
process does not aid in the realization of the common good because the leader presupposes the
common good by narrowly defining a homogenized people.
Ideally democracy reaches the ideals stated above; however, Schumpeter provides what
he believes is a more realistic assessment of modern democracy. This provides a much less
idealistic and more elitist understand of ‘the people’. Here Schumpeter mentions ‘the people’
only as votes to be won by elites. This understanding melds better with the populist
understanding, but still has some inconsistencies. Like my understanding of populism,
Schumpeter emphasizes the importance of the leader – those individuals that acquire power.
Schumpeter stresses the role of the leader because he believes modern democracy has evolved
into an elitist mode of governance. Elites, not ‘the people’, have the power and compete over
‘the people’, like commodities. Though populism also focuses on the role of the leader to
organize the masses, unlike Schumpeter’s definition the leader does not struggle for the votes
like commodities. Rather, he aims his platform at those whose vote he has already won.
Though Schumpeter and populism stress different aspects of the leader’s role, both point
out the inherent elitism within modern democracy. The traditional definition delineates the
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incorporation of all people to express the common will and hopefully reach the common good.
Ideally democracy would include ‘the people’, in practice it mostly excludes them from the
process. Examining the way modern democracy operates, Schumpeter notes that the public does
not actually control the government, but merely elects its leaders, who hold all or most of the
power. Though this implies that ‘the people’ have agency, really the leaders have most of the
control, presenting their political platform competing to win votes. Populism also addresses this
inherent elitism in liberal democracy. Populist leaders emerge in democracies because the
leaders (or elites) fail to address the “common people”. Though Schumpeter’s preferred
definition seems content with this outcome, populist leaders base their platform on changing this
situation. Populism attempts to correct the elitism, appealing to ‘the people’s’ lack of
incorporation.
Given that Sarah Palin operates within a liberal democratic society that values the power
of the electorate – rather than any given cultural group – her rhetoric does not generate the same
success as her populist contemporaries. During her tour across American Palin made comments
praising small towns as “the real America” and “pro-America areas of this great nation”.
Attempting to separate herself from the elitist Washington politicos – as populists do – in a
speech Palin said, “We believe that the best of America is in these small towns that we get to
visit, and in these wonderful little pockets of what I call the real America, being here with all of
you hard working very patriotic, um, very, um, pro-America areas of this great nation."63 When
Palin invokes the “real America” she defines her populist people; however, within a society that
does not conceive of ‘the people’ within terms of culture or community she faces more backlash.
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In fact, she publicly apologized for comments like these.64 Since Palin plays the political game in
a society that values diversity her one-dimensional populist conception of ‘the people’ will not
lead to her electoral success. Since a majority of the American people do not relate to each other
based on Palin’s definition of the ‘real America’ she will never have the electoral success of her
populist contemporaries.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Looking at contemporary populist regimes both in theory and in practice
I have demonstrated how populism emerges and operates. Focusing on Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales I have outlined the key features of populism as a movement
that emerges under certain political conditions. Both of these leaders operate within democratic
societies in which the people elect the leader; however, this paper has shown that the populist
type of democracy differs from that of liberal democracy. In fact, populism can emerge as a
reaction to liberal democracies shortcomings, specifically the inherent elitism present within its
institutions and processes. Unfortunately, populism’s reaction to this unjust reality creates a
worse type of democracy. While it includes the people that the government had previously failed
to address, it provides a false sense of agency and also alienates the rest of the electorate.
Populism may not correct liberal democracy’s flaws; but at least it draws attention to
its imperfections. While liberal democracy promotes equality and the incorporation of all people
into politics, its current manifestations fail to reach this ideal. American liberal democracy
allows the American electorate to choose its representatives; however, beyond this ability, the
government still operates on an elitist agenda, failing to serve those with the least agency and
capital, the most marginalized. Elites – institutions, representatives, lobbies and interest groups –
dictate much of the American political scene. Understanding that American liberal democracy is
far from reaching this ideal of total equality and incorporation demonstrates the appeal of a
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figure like Sarah Palin. Like any populist leader, she has found a niche of American people that
she feels American politics neglects. Using the same populist rhetoric and tactics as her Latin
American contemporaries, she hopes to win over the American people. Like the Bolivian and
Venezuelan situations, Palin believes that the government no longer addresses the needs of all
American people, but only those of the elites and intellectuals (on the coasts). She has used her
celebrity from the 2009 presidential election to spread this message. After quitting her job,
publishing her book, going on a book tour and now beginning her TV career as a Fox News
contributor (with her new show Real American Stories) and TLC reality show star, she has
secured her place as an American public figure. And these efforts have paid off. Two million
viewers tuned into the premier of Real American Stories and her Facebook fan page has over 1.5
million fans65 and media can’t get enough of Palin’s politics and antics.
Like any populist leader, Palin has used her visibility to align herself with ‘the people’.
However, gaining celebrity does not translate into political success. Though Palin has found her
niche, she alienates too many segments of the American electorate to ever win enough votes.
These same tactics work in Bolivia and Venezuela because a large segment of the electorate
relates to one another on cultural levels. Therefore, when Morales and Chávez narrowly define
their constituencies, they only alienate a minority and can guarantee electoral success by uniting
a majority of underserved people. In the United States, ‘the people’ do not relate along cultural
levels, but rather as the electorate. Even though the American government may not address the
needs of Palin’s ‘people’, and perhaps she can better represent this segment than the current
government, referring to ‘the people’ like her populist contemporaries will not lead to her
political success. These populist tactics and rhetoric Palin alienate too many other Americans
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that comprise ‘the people’. While Sarah Palin may be a household name, Palin’s populism
cannot flourish in American society.
Though Palin’s populism won’t eradicate America’s elitist institutions, it does highlight
liberal democracy’s failure to incorporate all people. While having elites or experts run a
government does not necessarily present any danger to democracy’s ideals, once these
institutions no longer govern on behalf of themselves and not the ‘the people’, then the
government begins to lose its democratic legitimacy and something needs to change.
Unfortunately, populism does not present the solution to this issue, but rather a reactionary
response that ultimately provides a worse type of democracy. If anything, populism has merits
because it demonstrates the failures of a government and does give voice to those who
previously had none. Perhaps liberal democracies and other inherently elite governments can
learn from populist movements and try to find a different, better solution.
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